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Psychological essentialism has been subject to much 
debate.  Yet a key implication – that people should defer 
to experts in categorizing natural kinds – has not been 
widely examined. Three experiments examine deference 
in the categorization of chemical kinds. The first 
establishes borderline cases used in the second and third. 
These latter show limited deference to experts, and some 
deference to non-experts. These data are consistent with 
a perspectival framework for concepts in which 
categorization is sometimes based on micro-structural 
properties and sometimes on appearance and function. 
Introduction 
According to psychological essentialism (Medin & 
Ortony, 1989) people believe that kinds have essences – 
things that make an object what it is – and act 
accordingly. For example, people might believe that 
horses have an essence – that all horses necessarily 
have the essence, and that something cannot be a horse 
without it. Behaviour is predicated on a belief in the 
possession of the essence: people should behave 
differently with an animal they come to believe lacks 
the horse-essence, and should withhold the word 
‘horse’ as its category label.  This psychological 
essentialism differs from metaphysical essentialism (cf. 
Kripke, 1980; Putnam, 1975), which is the view that 
natural kinds actually do possess essences. According 
to psychological essentialism people believe that kinds 
have an essence even if this belief turns out to be false 
(cf. Mayr, 1988). 
Much evidence has been cited as supporting 
psychological essentialism (cf. Gelman, Coley & 
Gottfried, 1994). For example, Keil (1989) and Rips 
(1989) showed that similarity based on superficial 
appearances could dissociate from categorization. 
People may go beyond appearances to seek deeper, 
causal principles as to why instances belong to 
categories. Such principles appear important even for 
very young children (Gelman, 2000; Gelman & Medin, 
1993). In an influential series of studies, Gelman & 
Wellman (1991) showed that 4 and 5 year olds 
categorized items according to the nature of their 
insides, and their innate potential rather than their 
outward appearance or environment. 
However, other empirical studies have suggested the 
relative unimportance of essences. Smith & Sloman 
(1994) showed that Rips’ demonstrated dissociation 
between categorization and similarity could only be 
obtained under certain task conditions. Malt (1994), 
showed that the categorization of instances of water is 
not fully explained by the proportion of H2O people 
believe the instances contain. For example, tears were 
less likely to be judged a type of ‘water’ than pond 
water, yet tears were thought to contain more H2O. Malt 
argued that categorizing liquids as ‘water’ depends not 
just on their microstructure, but also on other factors 
such as function and source. Braisby, Franks & 
Hampton (1996) presented their participants with some 
of the thought experiments used by Kripke and Putnam 
to articulate, and argue for, metaphysical essentialism. 
They found that their participants did not agree with the 
intuitions of Kripke and Putnam and argued that their 
participants were not truly essentialist, but sometimes 
gave more weight to micro-structural properties and 
sometimes more to appearance and function (though see 
Diesendruck & Gelman, 1999). 
There are further difficulties with the evidence 
claimed to support essentialism. First, as conceded by 
Gelman, Coley & Gottfried (1994), since participants 
are unlikely to articulate essentialist beliefs explicitly, 
much of the evidence for essentialism is indirect. That 
is, there is an inferential step between the information 
manipulated in studies, and an essentialist conclusion. 
For example, Gelman & Wellman (experiment 2) 
manipulated insides and outsides, and argued that the 
dependence of categorization on insides supports 
essentialism. Yet the argument requires a further 
premise – that children regard insides as essential. 
Without this, the essentialist conclusion is uncertain. As 
Fodor (1998) puts it “What’s further required … is the 
idea that what’s ‘inside’ … is causally responsible for 
how things that belong to the kind appear…” (p. 154–
155).  Similarly Strevens (2001) suggested that the 
evidence cited in favour of essentialism can be 
explained by the simpler belief that causal laws relate 
category membership to appearances, and do not 
warrant invoking the notion of essence (see the 
discussion between Ahn, Kalish, Gelman, Medin, 
Luhmann, Atran, Coley & Shafto, 2001, and Strevens, 
2001). 
The studies reported here take a different tack. They 
focus on a key implication of essentialism that has 
remained relatively unexplored. Putnam (1975) 
developed a corollary of essentialism that he labeled the 
Division of Linguistic Labour (DLL). Though the 
arguments were constructed around word meaning, they 
have been widely taken to apply to concepts (e.g., 
Fodor, 1998). According to DLL, people should defer 
to experts, i.e., those with more knowledge of a 
category’s likely essential properties. For instance, if a 
metallurgist categorizes a watch as “not gold,” other 
things being equal, essentialism requires lay people’s 
categorizations to conform. 
In spite of theoretical studies of deference (e.g., 
Fodor, 1998; Segal, 2000; Woodfield, 2000), there have 
been few empirical examinations either of the extent of 
deference, or even whether it occurs.  Malt (1990) 
presented her participants with objects that were 
described as appearing ‘halfway’ between two 
categories (e.g., a tree halfway between an oak and a 
maple). She asked them to choose one of three response 
options to signal how they would resolve the object’s 
category membership: ‘ask an expert’, ‘call it 
whichever you want’ or judge that, with more time, 
they could ‘tell which it is’. For natural kinds, 75% of 
participants chose ‘ask an expert’, whereas for artifacts 
(e.g., ‘boat-ship’), 63% chose ‘call it whichever you 
want’.  However, this evidence is only suggestive of the 
importance of expert opinion in categorization: 
participants could choose not to defer to an expert 
whose opinion they sought. Braisby (2001) examined 
deference more directly by looking at the categorization 
of borderline biological kinds. Around half of his 
participants switched their categorization judgments to 
agree with those of experts. However, one quarter did 
the same with non-expert judgments. Braisby argued 
that the data overall did not support psychological 
essentialism since participants did not consistently defer 
and based their judgments on non-essential properties 
such as appearance and function as well as ‘essential’ 
properties. 
This paper focuses on deference in categorizing 
chemical kinds. Much of the original argumentation for 
essentialism is based on natural kinds, yet empirical 
studies have almost exclusively focused on biological 
kinds.  Yet there are reasons to think that the 
categorization of biological and chemical kinds may 
differ.  First, it has been argued that metaphysical 
essentialism is not true for biological species (cf. 
Dupre, 1999; Mayr, 1988;), whereas similar arguments 
do not appear, for example, for the periodic table. 
Second, there is increasing evidence of the universal 
and domain-specific nature of biological thought (cf. 
Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994).  If biological thought is 
domain-specific, then it follows that the principles 
governing ‘chemical’ thought may differ.  Finally, there 
is much evidence that biological thought has a 
privileged folk status (e.g., Atran, 1998), though there 
have been no similar arguments for chemical kinds. 
The first experiment establishes borderline cases of 
chemical kinds. The second examines whether people 
defer to experts in categorizing these cases. The third 
considers whether people also ‘defer’ to non-experts. 
Experiment 1 
Design 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions: Appearance Unaltered and Appearance 
Altered. 
Method 
Participants 60 undergraduate psychology students 
attending an Open University residential school 
volunteered to participate. 
Materials Four chemical kinds were chosen, that were 
also familiar household items: vitamin C, salt, water 
and soap.  Scenarios were constructed to describe 
transformations of the kinds that were intended to 
produce borderlines. An example of an Appearance 
Unaltered scenario follows. “You have just bought a 
bottle of water from a reputable retailer. On examining 
its packaging closely you find that it has been produced 
by a new process that involves chemically transforming 
water. The transformation is such that the 
manufacturers have had to give the liquid a new 
chemical formula. However, the liquid looks, feels, 
smells and tastes just like water.”  For Appearance 
Altered scenarios the final sentence was altered – for 
example, to “Although the liquid looks, feels and tastes 
just like water, you notice that it smells unusual.” 
Scenarios were constructed for each kind following the 
same template, the only differences being due to the 
name of the kind, and this final sentence. 
Procedure Participants were presented with 4 
scenarios, as above. Half of the participants in each 
condition were presented with these scenarios in a 
random order; the rest saw them in reverse order.  All 
participants were given a practice example. After each 
scenario, they were presented with a categorization 
question (e.g., “is the liquid you have bought water?”) 
and asked to give a (forced-choice) Yes/No judgment. 
Participants were instructed to answer solely on the 
basis of the current scenario, and ignore preceding 
scenarios and answers. After completing the task, 
participants were asked to rate its difficulty on a 7-point 












Figure 1. Mean no. of Yes responses in experiment 
1 by type of transformation (maximum = 4). 
Results 
The mean difficulty rating for the task was 3.8; this did 
not differ for the two transformations. Figure 1 shows 
the mean number of Yes responses (maximum = 4). 
Both transformations resulted in the chemical kinds 
being treated as borderline cases (i.e., the proportion of 
positive categorizations was roughly 2, or 50%).  A 
one-way ANOVA showed that the difference between 
the two kinds of transformation was not significant. 
Discussion of Experiment 1 
The changes in chemical structure produced borderline 
items of the chemical kinds: for both transformations 
the proportion of positive categorizations hovered 
around 50%. These scenarios are therefore highly 
suitable for investigating deference, since the influence 
of expert opinion is likely to be greatest for uncertain 
categorizations. Moreover, the difficulty rating suggests 
participants easily understood the task and scenarios. 
Experiment 2 
This experiment considers how categorization depends 
on information concerning experts’ categorizations. 
Design 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions: Appearance Unaltered and Appearance 
Altered. All participants gave categorization judgments 
for both Positive and Negative expert categorizations. 
Method 
Participants 60 undergraduate psychology students 
attending a residential school volunteered to participate. 
None participated in experiment 1. 
Materials The same chemical kinds and scenarios as in 
experiment 1 were used. Scenarios were adapted to 
incorporate information concerning the categorization 
judgments of scientific experts. To determine which 
occupational group would be considered most expert, 
30 additional participants (that did not participate in the 
other experiments reported here) provided two different 
ratings. First, they indicated how knowledgeable they 
thought different occupational groups would be of each 
of the four kind’s chemical properties. Second, for each 
kind, they indicated the extent to which they would 
trust the categorization judgments of the different 
occupational groups. All ratings were given on a 7-
point scale (knowledge ratings: 1 = very little or no 
knowledge, 7 = extremely knowledgeable; trust ratings: 
1 = ‘do not trust members of the profession at all,’ 7  = 
‘trust members of the profession absolutely’). The 
group with the highest combined knowledge and trust 
ratings was ‘Chemists’ (5.7). 
Scenarios were adapted to include an additional 
sentence prior to the final one.  For example, for a 
positive Appearance Unaltered scenario the following 
sentence was added: “You also discover that according 
to most chemists the liquid you have bought is, in fact, 
water.” Negative scenarios were obtained by replacing 
“is” with “is not”. Appearance Altered scenarios 
differed in the final sentence, as for experiment 1. 
Procedure A similar procedure to experiment 1 was 
used. Participants were presented with 8 scenarios: each 
of the 4 chemical kinds was presented twice, once with 
a positive and once with a negative expert judgment. As 
in experiment 1, participants were instructed to respond 
solely on the basis of the current scenario, and ignore 
any previous scenarios and responses.  In each 
Transformation condition, half of the participants were 
presented with scenarios in a random order; the 
remainder saw these in the reverse order. 
Results 
The mean difficulty rating was 3.7; this did not differ 
for the two kinds of transformation. The mean number 
of Yes responses according to transformation and 
expert categorization is given in figure 2. When the 
chemists were described as giving positive 
categorization judgments, participants tended to give 
positive judgments too. Similarly, when the experts 
were described as giving negative categorization 
judgments, so did participants. 
A two-way ANOVA, with Transformation 
(Appearance Unaltered, Appearance Altered) as a 
between-subjects factor, and Expert Judgment (Yes, 
No) as a within-subjects factor revealed no difference 
between the two transformation conditions. There was a 
significant effect of Expert Judgment however (Yes 
condition: mean = 3.0; No condition: mean = 0.4; F = 
121.18, df = 1,58, p < 0.001). There was no interaction 
between Expert Judgment and Transformation.  These 
results were confirmed by an item analysis (Expert 
Judgment: F = 191.12, df = 1,6, p < 0.001) 
Although figure 2 suggests a dramatic switch in 















Figure 2.  Mean no. of Yes responses in experiment 2 
by transformation and expert judgment (max = 4). 
these are group data, and so do not directly reveal the 
extent to which individuals switch their categorizations. 
Consequently, individuals who adopted a consistent 
response pattern across all four kinds were classified 
into one of three types: Switchers, who responded Yes 
when the chemists’ judgment was Yes and No when the 
chemists’ judgment was No; Obdurate, who maintained 
their categorizations (either Yes or No) regardless of 
the chemists’ judgments; and Contrary, who gave 
opposing judgments to those of the chemists. Finally, 
those who did not consistently adopt one of these three 
patterns were labeled Mixed. Participants’ ratings of 
task difficulty did not differ across the four types; the 
numbers of participants falling into these types did not 
differ by transformation (chi-square(3) = 1.04, p = 
0.79). As shown in figure 3, 50% of participants were 
Switchers. Of the remainder, 1 was Contrary; 6 were 
Obdurate; and 23 (more than one-third) did not adopt a 
consistent pattern for all 8 scenarios. Of these latter, 22 
showed a pattern of being Obdurate for roughly 50% of 
scenarios and Switching for the rest. However, there 
was no consistency over which chemical kinds 
produced obduracy or switching across individuals. 
Discussion of Experiment 2 
Overall, information concerning experts’ (chemists’) 
categorization judgments appears to exert a dramatic 
influence on participants’ categorizations. However, 
while these data appear consistent with a division of 
linguistic labour, and hence with essentialism, the data 
do not offer strong support. 
First, the extent of Switching in the group data is 
represented by the difference between the Yes and No 
conditions, i.e., 3 out of 4 minus 0.4 out of 4 (= 2.6 or 
55%).  That is, only a small majority of responses 
overall show Switching.  Second, the group data mask 
how expert categorizations influence individuals. 
Individuals are influenced in different ways, but only 
50% consistently switched their categorizations to agree 
with the experts. Moreover, these data need careful 
interpretation since they only show the effect of expert 
judgment on categorization. As suggested earlier, 
deference is predicated on perceived knowledge of a 
category’s essential properties. It is therefore necessary 
to consider whether deference might emerge even in the 
absence of expertise. If it does, then the case for 
essentialism is correspondingly weakened. 
Experiment 3 
This experiment considers how categorization depends 
on information concerning non-experts’ categorizations. 
Design 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions: Appearance Unaltered and Appearance 
Altered. Participants gave categorization judgments for 
both Positive and Negative non-expert categorizations. 
Method 
Participants 60 undergraduate psychology students 
attending a residential school volunteered to participate. 
None participated in experiments 1 or 2. 
Materials The same chemical kinds in experiments 1 
and 2 were used. Scenarios were adapted from those in 
experiment 2 to include the categorization judgments of 
non-experts. Using the same ratings of occupational 
groups described earlier, ‘Shoppers’ was chosen as the 
non-expert group because they lack (chemical) 
expertise (mean combined knowledge and trust rating = 
2.3) yet have considerable familiarity with the chemical 
kinds. Scenarios were modified so that the word 
‘shopper(s)’ replaced the word ‘chemist(s)’. All other 
materials were identical to those of experiment 2. 
Procedure This was identical to that of experiment 2.  
Results 
The mean difficulty rating was 3.5; this did not differ 
for the two kinds of transformation. The mean number 
of Yes responses according to transformation and non-
expert categorization is shown in figure 4. When the 
shoppers were described as giving positive 
categorization judgments, participants tended to give 
positive judgments too. When the non-experts gave 
negative categorization judgments, so did participants. 
A two-way ANOVA, with Transformation 
(Appearance Unaltered, Appearance Altered) as a 
between-subjects factor, and Non-expert Judgment 
(Yes, No) as a within-subjects factor, showed there was 
no effect of Transformation. There was a significant 
effect of Non-expert Judgment however (Yes condition: 
mean = 1.9; No condition: mean = 1.1; F = 10.32, df = 
1,58, p < 0.01). There was no interaction between Non-






Switchers Obdurate Contrary Mixed
Figure 3. Numbers of participants adopting the four 
response patterns in experiment 2 (N = 60). 
were confirmed by item analysis also (Non-expert 
Judgment: F = 4.51, df = 1,6, p = 0.08). 
As before, these data were analysed according to the 
four individual response types: Switcher, Obdurate, 
Contrary and Mixed. Participants’ ratings of task 
difficulty did not differ across the four types; the 
numbers of participants falling into the four types did 
not differ by transformation (chi-square(3) = 3.90, p = 
0.27). Numbers of participants falling into these types 
of response pattern are shown in figure 5. 
Approximately 50% of participants adopted a mixed 
pattern of responses. Of these, most participants showed 
a pattern of mostly obduracy, with some switching and 
fewer contrary categorizations. Of the remainder, 2 
participants were Contrary; 15 were Obdurate; and 9 
were Switchers. 
Discussion of Experiments 2 and 3 
Overall participants tended not to switch their 
categorizations when given information about non-
expert judgment. Nevertheless, the extent of Switching 
in the group data amounts to 0.8 out of 4 (20%); 9 
individuals (15%) consistently Switched. Thus there is 
evidence of some limited, but surprising deference. 
The number of Yes responses for experiments 2 and 3 
were analysed in a three-way ANOVA with 
Transformation (Appearance Unaltered, Appearance 
Altered) and Expertise (Chemists, Shoppers) as 
between-subject factors, and Judgment (Yes, No) as a 
within-subjects factor.  This revealed an effect of 
Judgment (Yes condition: mean = 2.42, No condition = 
0.73; F = 99.35, df = 1,116, p < 0.001), and an 
interaction between Judgment and Expertise (F = 28.64, 
df = 1,116, p < 0.001), showing that the patterns in 
figures 2 and 4 differ.  Item analysis confirmed the 
main effect of Judgment (F = 37.61, df = 1,6, p < 0.01) 
and the interaction with Expertise (F = 85.07, df = 1,6, 
p < 0.001).    The numbers of individuals adopting the 
four different response patterns also differed by 
Expertise (chi-square(3) = 17.62, p < 0.01). 
General Discussion 
Overall these experiments reveal a limited difference in 
the way that information about expert and non-expert 
categorization judgments influences people’s 
categorizations and hence only a limited amount of 
deference in categorizing chemical kinds. The group 
data suggest that only 45% (i.e., 65% in experiment 2 
minus 20% in experiment 3) of categorizations 
switched because of the expertise (and presumed 
knowledge of essential properties) of chemists; the 
individual data suggest that only 35% of Switchers do 
so because of the chemists’ expertise. 
Why do only a minority of individuals consistently 
defer? One possibility is that psychological essentialism 
should not be interpreted so strongly. There are some 
hints of this in writings supporting essentialism, that 
variously refer to an essentialist  ‘bias’ or ‘heuristic’. 
This move would maintain consistency between 
essentialism and these otherwise recalcitrant data, but at 
a price. If people are credited as essentialist even when 
their categorizations are only sometimes based on 
essential properties, then essentialism loses explanatory 
value. In these experiments, for example, an appeal to 
essentialism would help explain only the minority of 
categorizations that involve switching; the remaining 
categorizations would still be in need of explanation. 
Another possibility is that the connection between 
essentialism and deference is weaker than assumed.  
The prediction that people should defer to experts is 
predicated on a conjunction of beliefs – people believe 
that essential properties determine category 
membership, that experts are knowledgeable about the 
relevant essential properties and that, generally 
speaking, expert judgment is reliable – and the 
presumption of rationality (that people should rationally 
follow the implications of their multiple beliefs).  
Anyone of these claims could in principle be in error.  
If so, these data could point to an elaboration of 
psychological essentialism, one that clarifies its 




















Switchers Obdurate Contrary Mixed
Figure 5. Numbers of participants adopting the four 
response patterns in experiment 3 (N = 60). 
Figure 4. Mean no. of Yes responses in experiment 3 
by type of transformation and non-expert 
categorization (maximum = 4). 
 
example, that essentialism makes different claims for 
chemical as opposed to biological kinds. 
Alternatively, consistent with the suggestions of 
Braisby, Franks & Hampton (1996), these data may 
point to the need for an account that treats 
categorization as flexible. According to a perspectival 
view, concepts have a content that shifts systematically 
according to perspective and context (Braisby, 1998). 
Concepts may then reflect micro-structural properties 
from some perspectives, but appearance and/or 
functional properties from others. These findings would 
then suggest that, in categorizing chemical kinds, 
people experience a conflict between deferring to 
experts based on their knowledge of micro-structural 
properties and being influenced by appearance and 
functional properties. If this is right, then a 
comprehensive account of concepts will need to provide 
a framework for different kinds of categorization (cf. 
Smith & Sloman, 1994) – that is, different ways (both 
essentialist and non-essentialist) in which people can 
think about chemical kinds. 
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